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FEDERAL BID PROTESTS: IS THE TAIL WAGGING THE DOG? 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT.   The fear of receiving a bid protest is said to affect acquisition 
strategies, yet it has not been empirically explored.  Based on the Public 
Value Framework and interviews with contracting personnel, this research 
tests a model of antecedents to and consequences of the fear of a protest.  
Survey data was obtained from a sample of 350 contracting personnel.  The 
fear of protest is mitigated by having sufficient procurement lead time and by 
source selection experience, and increased by protest risk.  Fear of protest 
increases compromised technical evaluations, added procurement lead time, 
and transaction costs, while it decreases contracting officer authority and is 
associated with source selection method inappropriateness.  Compromised 
technical evaluations, in turn, decrease contractor performance while 
contracting officer authority increases contractor performance.  Thus, 
findings suggests that, indeed, the tail is wagging the dog.  The research 
concludes with several managerial implications, study limitations and future 
research directions. 
 
 
 
Keywords:  Bid Protest; Federal Contracting; Acquisition Strategy; 
Source Selection 
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FEDERAL BID PROTESTS: IS THE TAIL WAGGING THE DOG? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 A central tenet of a public contracting system is to maintain the 
public’s trust via instilled integrity, fairness, and openness. A bid protest 
is a corrective mechanism to ensure integrity and fairness by providing 
an interested party with a process to air complaints and obtain relief 
(Manuel & Schwartz, 2011). A protest is a written objection that can 
occur at any stage of the contract award process (see Table 1). Most 
commonly, protests result from alleged errors or mistakes committed by 
the agency. The most common errors cited in protests are: poorly written 
or vague contract requirements, failure to follow the process or criteria 
laid out in the request for proposals, and failure to adequately document 
findings (GAO, 2014; Rumbaugh, 2010). 
TABLE 1 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR 33.101) Definition of a Protest 
“Protest” means a written objection by an interested party to any of the 
following: 
(1) a solicitation or other request by an agency for offers for a contract for 
the procurement of property or services, 
(2) the cancellation of the solicitation or other request, 
(3) an award or proposed award of the contract, or  
(4) a termination or cancellation of an award of the contract, if the written 
objection contains an allegation that the termination or cancellation is 
based in whole or in part on improprieties concerning the award of 
the contract.  
 
 Increasingly, protests are being filed for business reasons rather 
than to correct mistakes or errors. Between 2009 and 2013, protests 
grew from 1,989 to 2,429—a 22% increase during a period of increased 
federal austerity. When measured against the number of opportunities to 
protest from 2011 to 2013, the number of protests increased 29% (from 
0.014% to 0.019% of contract actions, including delivery orders). The 
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protests have also increased their disruptive power. Of those protest 
cases that made it to a decision in 2013 (i.e., the few that were not 
dismissed, settled, or withdrawn), 17% were sustained, and 43% of all 
protest cases were effective (either sustained or resulted in corrective 
action by the agency prior to decision). Evidence from one military 
department reveals that bid protest effectiveness increased from 37.9% 
in 2005 to 43.9% in 2010; more disturbingly, when controlling for the 
number of protestable contract actions, the rate for effective protests 
went from 0.65 to 1.59 per 1,000 actions, a 144% increase (FPDS-NG). 
 Acquisition officials loathe the receipt of a bid protest.  The 
potential to receive a bid protest drives agencies to incur costs to:  (1) 
prevent a protest (e.g., thoroughly documenting and substantiating 
proposal evaluations and trade-off decisions), (2) to defend against an 
actual protest lodged, and (3) to take corrective actions. At best, an 
agency’s voluntary corrective action means the competition is reopened, 
and proposals are allowed to be revised necessitating further evaluations 
and delaying the contract award.  At worst, an authority such as the 
Government Accountability Office sustains the protest meaning that the 
procurement process must often start anew.  This adds even more time 
and delays receipt of needed goods and services resulting in significant 
rework.  The end users bear costs as well, since their requirements are 
delayed or go unfulfilled. Hereinafter, we refer to the severely negative 
attitude toward receiving a bid protest as a “fear of protest.”  
 Evidence suggests that agencies sometimes change their 
acquisition strategies due to fear of protests. For example, fear of a 
protest could prompt officials to try to structure a procurement in a 
manner they deem less likely to be protested, such as using lowest-
price, technically-acceptable (LPTA) source selection method instead of 
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a full tradeoff method (Schwartz et al., 2013). Other reactions include 
awarding more contracts than intended to avoid a protest (e.g., Littoral 
Combat Ship). 
 While scholars and the GAO have identified these deleterious 
effects of bid protests on the government (Gordon, 2013), no research to 
date has quantified them. Specifically, we do not know the magnitude of 
fear of protests. Neither do we know the extent and manner that fear of a 
protest affects acquisition strategies or the lengths that acquisition 
professionals will go to avoid a protest. The purpose of this research, 
therefore, is to quantify the magnitude of protest fear, and to explore the 
antecedents and consequences of protest fear. 
 The remainder of this research is organized as follows. First, we 
present a background on bid protests. Second, the study discusses the 
conceptual framework and proposed hypotheses. The Public Value 
Framework is consulted to illuminate the relevant antecedents and 
consequences (Figure 1). Next, the study presents the research design 
and methodology. Then the study provides an analysis of the proposed 
models and reports the findings. Lastly, the study offers a summary 
discussion, including conclusions and implications. 
 
Background on Bid Protests 
 The evidence that bid protests are a problem comes from 
multiple vectors. Firstly, as already mentioned, the number and 
effectiveness of protests are increasing, especially since the economic 
downturn. Protests traditionally result from alleged errors or mistakes 
such as poorly written or vague contract requirements, or failure to follow 
the process or criteria laid out in the request for proposals, or lack of 
sufficient documentation (GAO, 2014; Rumbaugh, 2010). Other 
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traditional causes of protests include: a lack of meaningful discussions, 
defective solicitations, improper exclusion from the competitive range, a 
lack of cost realism, and agency bias or bad faith (GAO, 2014; 
Rumbaugh, 2010). 
 The increase in business motivations to file a bid protest derives 
from multiple factors. When agencies do not adequately document or 
debrief losing bidders, the losing companies may file a protest to 
determine why they lost the competition. Losing bidders may try to 
demonstrate their commitment to stakeholders and executives, even 
setting the precedent for the competition that they will delay contract 
award rather than acquiesce quietly (Schwartz, Manuel, & Martinez, 
2013). Sometimes protests are filed by incumbents to delay a switch in 
contractors, thereby gaining a few more months of revenue. 
 Bid protests levy monetary and non-monetary costs. Protests 
may result in: (1) a stop-work order that suspends performance (i.e., a 
delay to the agency), (2) reevaluating proposals (i.e., a second chance), 
(3) paying proposal preparation costs and protest filing costs to the 
protester (i.e., lost agency funds), (4) terminating an awarded contract(s) 
and re-soliciting the project (i.e., a delay to the agency and a second 
chance to the protestor) (Rumbaugh, 2010), and/or (5) a settlement that 
entails more awards than the agency anticipated to appease the 
protestor or a significant subcontract award from the successful prime 
contractor (Hoffman, 2013). 
 Fear of bid protests also increases transaction costs. Often, a 
fear of a bid protest will result in awarding more contracts than would 
have been awarded if there was no fear of a bid protest. In certain 
multiple-award contracts there is a minimum dollar value that the 
government is obligated to pay as consideration. This results in 
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increased spending of taxpayer money that could have been more 
efficiently spent by awarding to fewer, more competitive contractors. For 
example, the DODIG (2009) found that under the Seaport-E program, 
the Navy awarded 1,279 contracts for professional services yet 975 
(75.6%) never received a task order. Each of these contracts required 
either a $10,000 or $2,500 minimum obligation. In addition to added 
funds, added contracts create extra work for the contracting officer to 
administer, duplicate inventory, can increase transportation costs, result 
in non-optimal use of taxpayer money, and often upset contractors who 
never get an award under a multiple award contract for which they 
believed they were competitive. Although a reduced risk of a protest is 
accomplished, ultimately less value is added by the contracting process. 
What this does not accomplish is a best option for the customer or the 
taxpayer, nor does it provide fairness to the stronger contractors. 
 One way that the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition 
workforce avoids protest is to placate potential protesters. For example, 
building, fielding, and sustaining two varieties of Littoral Combat Ship 
platforms substantially increased costs relative to doing so for a single 
platform (O’Rourke, 2014). Another method to avoid bid protests relies 
on choosing sub-optimal source selection processes, such as minimizing 
discussions or even employing an LPTA source selection process when 
a full tradeoff method is more appropriate (Gordon, 2013). For example, 
the Air Force seriously considered an LPTA method for its controversy-
ridden aerial tanker acquisition (Pocock, 2009), currently running a $1.5 
billion cost overrun (Gates, 2014). 
 Another tactic to diminish bid protest risk consists of engaging in 
multiple rounds of discussions that essentially level the playing field of 
competitors rather than providing clearer evaluation criteria up-front. This 
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tactic frequently results in retaining mediocre suppliers in the 
consideration set, increasing the likelihood for a sub-optimal or mediocre 
contractor to provide important outsourced services/goods to the 
government. Clearer evaluation criteria better distinguish amongst firms, 
diminishing the propensity to retain mediocre firms in the competitive set. 
 An agency’s best policy to prevent a protest is to mitigate the 
causes of the protest; the greater the fear of protest, the more likely the 
agency will focus on mitigating the causes of the protest. The desire to 
avoid a protest is the driving force behind acquisition decisions, internal 
and external policies, and resources applied to mitigate the threat of a 
protest (Gordon, 2013; Kendall, 2012; Knauth, 2013; Manuel & 
Schwartz, 2011; Schwartz et al., 2013; Maser & Thompson, 2010; 
O’Rourke, 2014). Next we develop the theoretical framework and 
hypothesis for the antecedents and consequences of the fear of protests. 
LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES 
Public Value Framework (PVF) 
In the private sector, industry often uses shareholder value as a 
means of evaluating itself. In contrast to private sector operations, the 
government’s strategy does not revolve around a specific bottom line 
such as shareholder wealth. Contracting professionals must satisfy 
multiple stakeholders such as regulatory requirements (e.g., the FAR), 
internal customers, the private sector, and the taxpaying public. PVF was 
introduced by Harvard professor Mark H. Moore and has been used to 
evaluate and identify value in the public sector. The PVF has been 
utilized to motivate public managers to reconsider what is valuable in 
their services, and to rethink the management and effectiveness of their 
services (Coats & Passmore, 2008). 
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The PVF can be explained by the strategic triangle (Heymann, 
1987; Moore, 1995): value, the authorizing environment, and resources. 
Value determines how the organization measures its performance. The 
purpose of the organization derives from the vision inspired by the value 
proposition it provides to the public, usually called public value. The 
organization justifies its existence to stakeholders—internal and 
external—based on the vision inspired by its definition of public value 
(Moore, 2000). In essence, value in a governmental organization 
equates to mission. Contracting officers demonstrate value by measuring 
performance related to and resulting from their ability to connect capable 
suppliers to internal organizations in need of quality goods and services. 
The authorizing environment for the organization includes 
citizens, elected representatives, interest groups, and the media that 
comprise the wellspring of legitimacy and support (Moore, 2000). 
Legitimacy and support—tangible and intangible—define the enterprising 
leader’s terrain of influence for pursuing public value, and is limited by 
the stakeholders and institutions that provide the necessary financial 
resources and consent. In turn, the resources define the operational 
capability of the organization. Operational capability determines 
organizational performance, which depends on sufficient know-how and 
capability to attain the defined public value. Operational capability may 
reside entirely within the organization, although in the case of contracted 
services and goods, it frequently exists outside the organization. 
Organizations increasingly leverage supplier relationships to achieve 
desired results, which increases the strategic value of the contracting 
officer. 
PVF observes that in the private sector, organizational survival 
and financial performance align well with the social value of the 
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organization. A retailer that efficiently and effectively provides needed 
goods to consumers will survive and be profitable. Non-profits exist to 
provide needed social value where the private sector cannot be 
profitable and sustain itself. For the non-profit manager, benefits accrue 
as the result of satisfying stakeholders in the authorizing environment, 
ideally through demonstrated delivery of public value. However, different 
members of the authorizing environment often have differing priorities 
when it comes to public value and how to achieve it. 
Contracting professionals add value by helping to meet the 
operational needs of the government and, at the same time, providing 
fairness and addressing the various public policy issues required by law 
and regulation. When these align, customers receive what they require at 
a fair and reasonable price, and this satisfies the requirements of 
governing policies. 
Contracting officers sometimes take steps throughout the 
acquisition process to avoid a protest. With regard to the fear of protest, 
high dollar contracts in particular hold great interest to media and elected 
officials; there may be an element of public shame if a source selection is 
protested. If there is a notion that organizational management would not 
support the contracting officers and that the protest may reflect poorly on 
them in the media or political arena, there can be a tendency to take 
measures that can sub-optimize source selection decisions and 
outcomes in order to avoid a protest. With these concerns in the back of 
a contracting officer’s mind, the contracting officer may, for example, 
minimize discussions or even employ an LPTA source selection process 
when a full tradeoff method is more appropriate (Gordon, 2013). When 
this occurs, the contracting system is not optimizing public value. 
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Fear of a protest is a pragmatic concern for contracting 
professionals. Significant time is consumed addressing a protest. 
Ultimately, contracting officers then have less time and resources to 
devote to other duties; the needs of the customer do not stop because of 
a protest. This decreases the value of the contracting support. 
 
Antecedents to Fear of Protest 
Sufficiency of Planned Procurement Administrative Lead Time  
 For buyers, time has become the ultimate non-fungible resource, 
with important implications for the sourcing and supplier relationship 
processes. One major retailer’s buyers meet only one hour per quarter 
with suppliers (Hansen, 2009). Indeed, the relationship management 
strategy reduces essentially to the time management strategy 
designated during the source selection process. 
 Sufficient planned procurement administrative lead time (PALT) 
represents the extent to which adequate time is allotted to accomplish a 
source selection. Insufficient PALT is often the result of funding 
constraints that occur toward the end of the fiscal year.  Expedited 
requirements and poor planning are also common reasons that can lead 
to insufficient PALT. Protestable errors are more likely to occur when 
sufficient lead time is not allocated (Hawkins et al., 2011) to: properly 
define requirements, evaluation criteria, and instructions to offerors; train 
the technical evaluators; evaluate proposals; document evaluations and 
tradeoffs; and prepare for and brief decision makers. The acquisition 
team’s capability to perform a source selection successfully depends on 
sufficient time to prepare. 
 In terms of PVF, time affords the ability for acquisition teams to 
apply their knowledge and skills, bolstering operational capability. 
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Acquisition professionals also need time to communicate with 
stakeholders to garner support and communicate potential impacts to the 
value proposition. Insufficient time constrains operational capability, 
support from the authorizing environment, and evaluation of impacts on 
public value. Therefore, it is posited that: 
H1: Insufficient planned PALT is positively related to fear of 
protest. 
Contracting Officer Experience  
The PVF holds that operational capability is the measure of how 
government activities deliver value. Operational capability represents 
requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities—all of which depend on 
experience. Buyer experience has been found to affect government 
procurement processes (Hawkins and Muir, 2014). The more experience 
a contracting officer has, the less concern of a protest there should be 
since the individual has acquired more knowledge in techniques and 
practices to prevent bid protests and prevail in the event of a protest. 
Experience reflects the sum total of the contracting officer’s 
knowledge, skills, and abilities that result from experience at source 
selection decisions. In the PVF, organizational goals derive from its 
definition of public value, and contracting officer experience represents a 
primary source of operational capability for performance at achieving 
value. Econom (2006) argued that federal agencies must consider 
contract management as a core competency because the functions 
performed by third-party contractors are often essential in successfully 
achieving organizational goals. She concluded that the success of 
acquisition organizations is largely dependent on hiring personnel who 
possess the right mix of skills, abilities, experience, and training. 
Practitioner survey work reveals that a small percentage (~5%) of 
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acquisition leaders rates the workforce as highly competent, indicating 
that competence is a scarce resource (Clark, 2015). 
Other studies have also found that this right mix is critical to 
achieving contract performance outcomes (United States Merit Systems 
Protection Board, 2005). Time spent in a competency correlates strongly 
with self-reported proficiency levels in that competency (FAI, 2012), 
suggesting that experience matters. In terms of public value, greater 
contracting officer experience improves operational capability through 
enhanced understanding and expertise with the authorizing environment. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
H2: The greater contracting officer experience, the lower the fear 
of protest. 
 
Consequences of Fear of Protest 
Compromised Technical Evaluation 
 Evaluation factors and significant sub factors must (1) represent 
the key areas of importance and emphasis to be considered in the 
source selection decision; and (2) support meaningful comparison and 
discrimination between and among competing proposals (FAR 
15.304(b)). Agencies must evaluate the proposals and assess their 
relative qualities based only on the factors and subfactors specified in 
the request for proposal (RFP) (Rumbaugh, 2010). Deviations from the 
strict language defining the meaning of factors and subfactors can invite 
protests. Technical evaluators often do not understand or appreciate this 
constraint. In terms of PVF, poorly-trained or technical evaluators 
unknowledgeable in source selections inhibit the agency’s operational 
capability. 
 Commonly, the evaluators assessing proposals are not the same 
individuals who defined the meaning of the factors and subfactors. Thus, 
technical evaluators can bring their own interpretation or agenda to bear 
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on their evaluations based upon their relationship to different 
components of the authorizing environment that provides legitimacy and 
support. For these reasons, the contracting officer, legal advisor, and 
contracts committee advisors often require numerous, meticulous 
changes to precise wording of evaluations. Evaluators are constrained 
on what they can say in the evaluation – even though the point otherwise 
intended may make a meaningful distinction between offers. Additionally, 
definitions of the factors or subfactors may not account for meaningful 
distinctions. Often this phenomenon reflects a lack of foresight – 
sometimes preventable, sometimes not. Sometimes the distinction is 
only illuminated upon evaluation of proposals. At this point, the source 
selection team must weigh a delay in the schedule against the benefit of 
changing the definition of factors or subfactors to account for the 
meaningful distinction, and allow offerors time to revise their proposals. 
Often, however, the customer is not willing to delay the source selection, 
and the subfactors are not revised. As described by PVF, the disconnect 
between profit and social good pushes contracting officers toward 
managing a leg of the strategic triangle under their influence; by 
compromising technical evaluations (operational capability), they elevate 
performance measures presented to their authorizing environment, 
which diminishes the fear of protest. Therefore, it is posited that: 
H3: Fear of protest is positively related to compromised technical 
evaluations. 
 
Source Selection Method Appropriateness 
 The acquisition’s authorizing environment for competitive formal 
source selections allows several methods: lowest-price, technically-
acceptable (LPTA), price-performance tradeoff (PPT), or a full tradeoff. 
In PVF logic, each method defines how to measure the public value of 
the contract. According to FAR 15.101-2, the LPTA source selection 
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process is appropriate when best value is expected to result from 
selection of the technically-acceptable proposal with the lowest 
evaluated price. There are many reasons why a contracting officer might 
opt for the LPTA. One major benefit of this strategy is that the agency 
can greatly shorten the evaluation process because once the low price 
proposal has been found to be technically acceptable, there is no need 
to evaluate the acceptability of any other proposals (Cibinic et al., 2011, 
p. 680). 
  The source selection method appropriateness depends on the 
requirement and the buying situation. Generally, the greater the 
performance risk, criticality of the requirement’s successful delivery to 
the agency’s mission, dollar value, environmental dynamism, uncertain 
requirements, and complexity, the more important contractor 
performance becomes and the less critical cost/price become. In these 
cases, an agency may decide that the best-value offer is determined by 
a full tradeoff of price and non-price factors. A full tradeoff process is 
appropriate when it may be in the best interest of the government to 
consider an award to a company other than the lowest-priced offeror or 
other than the highest technically-rated offeror (FAR 15.101-1). 
 In practice, however, agencies may not select the source 
selection method that is best suited to the requirement and the buying 
situation. Indeed, a practitioner survey indicates that only 5% of 
acquisition leaders rated the workforce highly competent at selecting the 
right contract structures, techniques and strategies (Clark, 2015). 
Today’s budget-constrained environment may influence managers to 
prefer LPTA over a full tradeoff. Managers may also wish to avoid a 
protest, in which case the LPTA method is clearly the lower-risk 
alternative. Air Force acquisition leaders, following several bid protests 
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and failed attempts to acquire a new tanker aircraft, seriously considered 
an LPTA method for a multi-billion dollar weapon system (Pocock, 2009). 
Finally, quite often managers prioritize the contract award date (i.e., 
PALT) over due diligence in contractor selection (Hawkins, 2012). These 
factors implicate overuse of LPTA because it is simpler and faster, with 
lower risk of making a protestable mistake. In all these scenarios, public 
value and organizational performance suffer in the eyes of the 
authorizing environment, and contracting officers resort to changing the 
definition of performance to reduce the perceived threat to public value 
performance. Therefore, we posit that: 
H4: Fear of protest is negatively related to source selection 
method appropriateness. 
 
Added PALT 
 Naturally, as the concern over a protest grows, acquisition teams 
take added measures to prevent them. In PVF terms, concerns over a 
protest embody threats to legitimacy and support.  Added measures 
reflect acquisition team efforts to leverage operational capability to 
bolster public value performance in response to the threats. Added 
measures often manifest as increased reviews resulting in increased 
iterations of source selection documents such as source selection plans, 
requests for proposals, technical evaluations, small business strategy, 
comparative analyses, briefing charts, source selection decision 
documents, and evaluation notices to offerors – just to name a few. 
These revisions consume time during the source selection. Additionally, 
a conservative stance may result in added rounds of discussions to clear 
up all proposal deficiencies and weaknesses – a concept referred to as 
technical leveling. Conservatism may also result in retaining otherwise 
non-competitive offerors in the competitive range adding time to 
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negotiate with and evaluate another offer. Theoretically, acquisition 
managers have limited influence over the authorizing environment 
(legislation), but they do have influence over PALT, an important 
operational capability that may improve performance. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H5: There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest 
and the added PALT. 
 
Contracting Officer Perceived Authority 
 Contracting officers uniquely hold authority to enter into, 
administer, and terminate contracts. They are the only individuals 
authorized by law to bind the U.S. Government. Contracting officers are 
responsible for: (1) ensuring that all the necessary actions for effective 
contracting are accomplished, (2) ensuring compliance with the terms of 
the contract, and (3) safeguarding the interests of the U.S. Government 
in its contractual relationships. In terms of PVF, the contracting officer’s 
authority provides the operational capability to protect the various 
stakeholders’ interests (e.g., taxpayer, contractor, Government, internal 
customers). In this capacity, the contracting officer reinforces legitimacy 
and support in the pursuit of greater public value. 
 While contracting officers must request and consider the advice 
of specialists (e.g., law, engineering, finance, etc.), ultimately, decisions 
within their purview are their responsibility (FAR 1.602-2). Upon receipt 
of a protest, legal counsel must divert time and effort to defend the 
agency’s actions. Thus, legal counsel reviews the many iterations of the 
multitude of source selection documents to ensure legal sufficiency, 
compliance to regulations and policies, and to mitigate the risks of 
protests. With the consequences at stake, such as setting precedent, 
reputation, and invested time, legal counsel is typically conservative in 
attempting to prevent a bid protest. Since legal counsel brings their own 
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unique legal authority and professional expertise, contracting officers and 
acquisition managers rely heavily on its opinions and recommendations. 
Contracting officers are likely to yield their decision making discretion 
(e.g., removing an offeror from the competitive range) when legal 
counsel disagrees with them. During the scale development process for 
this study, one interviewee shared: “We almost never move forward 
unless they [legal] give us their okay. It would be very, very hard—very 
challenging.” This comment alludes to the influence of legal counsel on 
acquisition and unit leaders; in its advisory role, it subtly, yet strongly, 
affects the contracting officer’s authority through its opinions and 
recommendations. 
 Other parties impose a similar sway on contracting officers’ 
decision authority. For example, higher ranking contracts committee 
members and leaders may also hold opinions on a particular source 
selection matter that are contrary to that of the contracting officer. In 
such cases, contracting officers may perceive unwritten career 
implications to making contrarian decisions. Thus, although certain 
statutory authority resides with the contracting officer, the reality is that 
such authority is yielded in practice. As protest risk – and thus, fear of a 
protest - grows, so does the involvement of legal counsel, other 
reviewing parties, and acquisition leaders. Increased involvement likely 
reduces the contracting officer’s perception of decision latitude. In some 
instances, contracting officers indicate that legal counsel would not allow 
them to make decisions – creating the organizational norm that legal has 
the final decision, not the contracting officer. As posited by PVF’s 
strategic triangle—and as intended by law—the operational capability of 
the contracting officer depends on the legitimacy and support from the 
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legal and other oversight in the authorizing environment. Thus, we posit 
that: 
H6: There is a negative relationship between fear of protest and 
the contracting officer’s perceived authority. 
 
 When an individual holds decision-making authority coupled 
with accountability for the results of decisions (e.g., a contracting officer), 
he or she tends not to defer decisions entirely to others. This is not to 
say, however, that others are not consulted. In public contracting, similar 
to input from advisors on source selection method choices, advisors 
review all of the written technical evaluations with respect to the 
evaluation criteria published in the request for proposals. They screen for 
errors, omissions, consistency, and other matters of compliance with 
laws, regulations, and policies in an effort to mitigate the odds of 
receiving a bid protest. In doing so, they are aligning the legitimacy and 
support with their other resources in order to bolster public value 
outcomes. Advisors often limit what the technical evaluators can say. 
Such scrutiny can make difficult the ability to meaningfully discriminate 
between proposals. Similar to the previously-discussed rationale, while 
contracting officers also review the technical evaluations for errors, they 
are more apt to accept more risk. Thus, it is posited that: 
 
H7: Contracting officer authority is negatively related to 
compromised technical evaluations.  
 
Transaction Costs   
 The substantial increase in protests by industry against 
competitive sourcing decisions have increased legal and acquisition 
requirements, caused program delays, and delayed delivery (Young, 
2007)—all of which increase transaction costs. Transaction costs reflect 
the monetary costs of resources devoted to executing a formal source 
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selection – largely comprised of labor costs of the different acquisition 
professionals involved such as the contracting officer, contracting 
specialist, technical evaluator, legal counsel, cost/price analyst, past 
performance team, program manager, Small Business Administration 
representative, and consultants. Transaction costs could be considered 
an opportunity cost of resources not devoted to other work requirements 
(e.g., contract and program administration). 
 An increased risk of protest provokes risk mitigation in the form 
of increased operational capability; in other words, more personnel are 
involved and they allocate more of their time and effort to defending 
against a potential bid protest. Thus, 
H8: There is a direct positive relationship between fear of protest 
and transaction costs. 
 
Contractor Performance  
 An organization’s mission is increasingly performed or supported 
via outsourced contracts, which means that contractor success has 
become a strategic component of operational capability for the agency it 
supports. In order for an agency to provide its public value, the supplier 
must perform well under the obligations of their contract. The 
development of contract obligations during the source selection process 
determines the level of performance ultimately received. 
 When the Government utilizes a best-value source selection 
method, technical evaluators apply evaluation factors and subfactors to 
proposals to determine the best-value offer. This process helps the 
government to hedge against substandard and/or non-performance by 
weeding out the less-capable firms (or teams of firms). The premise of 
source selection is that by applying the evaluation factors and 
subfactors, a very capable contractor has higher odds of being deemed 
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the best-value offer.  Nonetheless, the Government struggles in its 
efforts to unambiguously define technical factors and subfactors such 
that they can make meaningful distinctions between offers (Rumbaugh, 
2010). Once weaknesses in evaluation factors are realized, particularly 
after receipt of proposals, acquisition teams are reluctant to fix the 
factors by amending the RFP and inviting revised proposals since this 
delays the acquisition milestones. Additionally, conservative evaluators 
(and their advisors), for fear of protest, often engage in multiple rounds of 
discussions that essentially level the playing field of competitors, and 
often they retain mediocre offerors in the competitive range for fear of 
receiving a bid protest. Had the evaluation criteria been better able to 
distinguish amongst the firms, the propensity to retain mediocre firms 
within the competitive range would be diminished. In essence, the 
legitimacy provided by the authorizing environment is redirected to 
undermine the contracting agency’s operational capability for technical 
evaluation, which diminishes the third leg of the PVF strategic triangle: 
performance. Together, therefore, it is expected that:  
 
H9: There is a negative relationship between compromised 
technical evaluation and contractor performance. 
 
 Contracting officers are generally more cognizant of and 
empathetic to the effects of contractor performance on the requiring 
organization’s mission attainment than are risk-averse advisors such as 
legal counsel. Contracting officers may prioritize mission performance 
over protest risk in making key decisions during a source selection. For 
example, they may be more apt to remove a less-competitive or less-
capable offeror from the competitive range, assign a lower proposal 
rating, and not engage in added rounds of discussions solely to mitigate 
protest risk (thereby mitigating technical leveling). In some cases, 
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contracting officers may also be more apt to choose a full tradeoff rather 
than a LPTA source selection method as the most appropriate means to 
attain the best-value contractor. The full tradeoff method allows the 
Government the flexibility to pay more for superior capability and/or past 
performance when warranted. Since the procedures are so nuanced, full 
tradeoff also requires more effort, invites more error, and thus, protest 
risk. These actions reduce the odds of having to award a contract to a 
less-capable contractor, for example, in the case of a LPTA source 
selection method. In effect, proper alignment of legitimacy and support 
with contracting operational capability bolsters public value outcomes. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H10:  There is a positive relationship between source selection 
method appropriateness and contractor performance. 
 
 
Taken together, then, it is expected that a contracting officer with 
decision-making authority – and who does not defer that authority to 
others - will make decisions that accept more risk yet does not impede 
the selection of the best-suited contractor for the task at hand. When the 
selection is not constrained by procedures, greater decision latitude 
results in a better match between the offeror’s capabilities and the 
contractual requirements. This reflects better alignment between the legs 
of PVF’s strategic triangle: the authorizing environment bolsters the 
contracting officer’s capability to align the offeror’s capabilities with the 
desired public value outcomes. Examining the troubled U.S. defense 
acquisition system’s capability to reinforce contracting officer authority, 
the Defense Business Board concluded: “Of the eight findings, three of 
them concern the acquisition workforce, a large group of dedicated 
public servants who work diligently, but ultimately struggle within a 
broken system that is focused on avoiding mistakes rather than 
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producing more, in less time, at less cost” (Punaro, 2012). The 
contracting officer achieves contract success in proportion to the 
authorization and support from the acquisition authorizing environment. 
Therefore, it is posited that:  
 
H11: There is a positive relationship between contracting officer 
authority and contractor performance. 
 
The relationships posited above are visually depicted in Figure 1. 
Fear of protest can also be affected by the criticality of the requirement 
and by protest risk. Therefore, these constructs are shown as control 
variables. 
 
Figure 1 
Conceptual Model of Fear of Protest 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
This study employed a survey to collect empirical data followed 
by quantitative analysis.  The research employed structural equation 
models using the cross-sectional survey data.  The remainder of this 
section details the survey development, pretest, the sample, data 
collection, and reliability and validity. 
Questionnaire Design and Construct Measurement 
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All scales measuring latent constructs used a Likert-type scale. 
No previously-validated scales were available to measure the fear of 
protest, contracting officer authority, and source selection method 
appropriateness; thus, interview data (Appendix A) were used to develop 
these scale items (Appendix B). Fear of protest describes the level of 
apprehension a contracting professional has about receiving a bid 
protest. The contracting officer authority construct described how 
empowered the contracting officer is to make final decisions during the 
source selection process. Source selection method appropriateness is 
the perceived extent that the chosen source selection method fits the 
requirement, the goals of the source selection, the commercial market, 
and the acquisition situation. 
Pre-existing scales were used when available. A three-question 
scale was used to measure the sufficiency of planned PALT in the 
milestones and allocated by the acquisition team and its managers to 
conduct the source selection (Hawkins and Muir, 2014). Compromised 
technical evaluation assessed the extent to which technical evaluators 
complained about the limitations imposed on the wording of their written 
technical evaluations. Contractor performance is a measure of the 
contractor’s performance levels and the degree to which requirements 
were satisfied. The scale was adapted from Fawcett, Smith, & Cooper 
(1997), Cannon, Achrol, & Gundlach (2000), and Prahinski & Benton 
(2004). 
The remaining variables were objectively measured. Experience 
was measured as the number of source selections the respondent 
previously experienced. This could include FAR Part 15 (i.e., formal) and 
non-FAR Part 15 (e.g., simplified) source selections. It could also include 
those source selections to which the respondent served as the procuring 
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contracting officer as well as those to which the respondent served as an 
advisor, reviewer, or specialist. Added PALT objectively measured the 
difference between the planned PALT (in days) and the actual PALT (in 
days). Transaction costs attempted to quantify the personnel costs 
based on amount of time spent on the source selection by each member 
of the team. Transaction costs were calculated by asking respondents 
the number of people by role, pay grade, and fraction of one year’s time 
spent on the source selection. The average 2013 General Schedule 
annual pay was used to calculate the cost for each role, and then 
summed for each source selection. 
Survey Pretest 
 Six industry practitioners and academicians tested the initial 
survey to ensure face validity, construct validity, to construct and validate 
a conceptual model, and to help develop survey items to validly measure 
the constructs – many of which were new (i.e., measurement scales did 
not exist).  Additionally, 18 contracting officers were interviewed 
(Appendix A).  Feedback received was used to refine questions and limit 
survey length. As a result, one construct was removed and the order of 
the survey questions was structured to reduce bias among scale items 
by mixing questions across constructs with like scales and scale 
anchors. 
Sample 
 The population for this study consisted of U.S. civilian and 
military contracting personnel who had executed a FAR Part 15 formal 
source selection (i.e., a dollar amount greater than $150,000). This 
excluded simplified procurements that are generally less susceptible to 
bid protests. A list of e-mail addresses was generated using data 
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extracted from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation 
(FPDS-NG) database to encompass all transactions that fit the criteria 
previously stated. 
 The unit of analysis for this survey was one source selection 
event. Since nearly all bid protests stem from a protestable action (e.g., a 
proposal rating, rating justification, or basis of a tradeoff analysis) 
associated with a source selection, this is the proper unit of analysis for 
the study. Respondents were instructed to answer the survey questions 
using their experience from their most recently-completed FAR Part 15 
source selection. The most recent source selection was required to serve 
as the basis of reference in order to prevent respondents’ self-selection 
bias. 
RESULTS 
Data Collection 
 An online survey was used to collect the data. In order to 
maximize the response rate, we utilized Dillman’s (2000) “Tailored 
Design Method” for internet surveys. A survey invitation was sent via e-
mail to 3,882 contracting officers who had executed a FAR Part 15-
based formal source selection. The survey was left active for 42 days, 
with 3 reminders being sent during that time. There were 661 responses 
received, which yielded a 17% response rate. Of the responses received, 
311 were deleted due to missing or obviously invalid data, leaving 350 
usable responses. The final response rate of usable responses was 9%. 
 The average respondent had 13.6 years of federal contracting 
experience. Male respondents accounted for 50.64 percent and female 
respondents accounted for 49.36 percent. Only 2.29% of respondents 
held only a high school diploma or general equivalency diploma, 3.14% 
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held an associate’s degree, 38% held a bachelor’s degree, 54% held a 
master’s degree, and 2.57% held a doctorate. The average number of 
protests experienced was 1.96, and 15.4% of respondents had 
experienced a sustained protest.   
TABLE 2 
Contract Type and Goods/Services Procured 
 
 
Reliability and Validity 
 
Through iterative scale purification (Churchill, 1979) using 
exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation, 39 survey items 
reduced to 25 across seven latent factors. The reliability of latent 
constructs was assessed using composite reliabilities (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981). These measures, ranging from .80 to .96 (see Table 3), 
proved to be sufficiently reliable, exceeding the minimum acceptable 
threshold of .70 (Nunnally, 1978). Construct validity was assessed via 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in LISREL version 8.8. In the 
measurement model all loadings were significant at the .05 level, 
standard errors were not abnormal; no standardized loadings exceeded 
1.0, and no negative error variances (Heywood Cases) occurred. The 
measurement model (CFA) exhibited acceptable fit (Table 5). 
Contract Type  % of 
Total  
Supply or 
Service 
Purchased 
% of 
Total 
Fixed Price 60.00%  Services 58.00% 
Cost 
Reimbursement 27.14%  Construction 16.86% 
Time and 
Materials 1.14%  
Supplies or 
Commodities 15.71% 
Labor Hours 0.57%  
Weapons 
System 6.57% 
Hybrid 9.14%  
Other Capital 
Equipment 2.86% 
Other 2.00%    
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TABLE 3 
Correlation Matrix and Composite Reliabilities 
 FEAR PALTP RC EXP PRISK CTE PALTA SSMA AUTH PERF TC 
FEAR .90           
PALTP -.21* .81          
RC .10 -.04 .86         
EXP -.10 -.09 .01 ---        
PRISK .20* -.24* .14* .00 ---       
CTE .25* -.24* -.02 -.04 .13* .80      
PALTA .11* -.06 .03 .06 .09 .01 ---     
SSMA -.07 .28* .26* .03 .01 -.22* -.04 .92    
AUTH -.09 .20* .20* .10 -.06 -.24* -.03 .40* .89   
PERF -.06 .20 .20* .00 -.06 -.24* -.11* .30* .21* .96  
TC .12* .00 .17* -.13* .09 .13* .06 -.02 .04 -.16 --- 
Notes: (1) Correlations are below the diagonal. (2) Composite reliabilities 
of the latent factors are on the diagonal. (3) *Significant, p<.05 (4) 
FEAR=fear of protest; PALTP=sufficiency of planned procurement lead time; 
RC=requirement criticality; EXP=source selection experience; 
PRISK=protest risk; CTE=compromised technical evaluation; PALTA=added 
procurement lead time; SSMA=source selection method appropriateness; 
AUTH=contracting officer perceived authority; PERF=contractor 
performance; TC=transaction costs. 
 
Table 4 shows the average variance extracted (AVE) of each 
construct; all exceeded the .50 standard, demonstrating convergent 
validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). We then compared each AVE to the 
variance shared between constructs. None of the shared variances 
approached the AVE, providing sufficient evidence that the constructs 
were indeed unique (Lam, Shankar and Murthy, 2004). We tested for 
non-response bias using Armstrong & Overton’s (1977) approach. 
Responses were categorized into three groups according to the time 
received. Tests for differences in three latent constructs and two 
demographic variables revealed no significant differences, indicating a 
lack of response bias in the data. 
TABLE 4 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity 
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 FEAR PALTP RC CTE SSMA AUTH PERF 
FEAR .70       
PALTP .04 .59      
RC .01 .00 .68     
CTE .06 .06 .04 .59    
SSMA .00 .08 .07 .05 .79   
AUTH .01 .04 .04 .06 .16 .74  
PERF .00 .04 .04 .06 .09 .04 .81 
Notes: (1) Diagonal entries represent average variance extracted (AVE). 
(2) Off-diagonal entries represent shared variance. 
 
 
TABLE 5 
Measurement and Structural Models 
 
Model χ2 
(dof) 
TLI CFI AGFI RMSEA SRMR Critical 
N 
Measurement 
(CFA) 
396.8 
(308) 
.99 .99 .90 .026 .04 326 
Full Structural 534.8 
(334), 
p<.01 
.98 .98 .88 .040 .10 261 
Trimmed 
Structural 
374.3 
(262), 
p<.01 
.98 .98 .91 .032 .079 298 
 
A structural equation model (SEM) was then fit to the data. A 
global assessment (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988) of the various goodness-of-fit 
indices indicated questionable fit (Table 5). Most problematic were the 
AGFI (< .90) and the SRMR (>.08). Examining the hypotheses, the 
relationship between fear of protest and source selection method 
appropriateness (SSMA) was not significant. Therefore, we trimmed 
SSMA from the model. The trimmed model exhibited solid fit (Table 5). 
While the chi square test was significant, indicating a difference between 
the hypothesized model and the data, the CFI, TLI, AGFI, RMSEA and 
SRMR suggest good fit. Table 6 shows the results of hypotheses tested 
using the trimmed SEM. Nine of eleven hypotheses tested were 
supported, although the variance explained in the focal endogenous 
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construct - fear of protest – by the exogenous constructs was very low 
(9%). 
TABLE 6 
Test Of Hypotheses & Estimates Of Structural Equations Model 
 
Tests of Hypotheses**** 
 
Standardized 
Estimate 
t-
value 
Result* 
(S/NS) 
H1: Sufficiency of Planned 
PALT to Fear of Protest  
-.20 -3.28 S 
H2: Source Selection 
Experience to Fear of Protest 
-.12 -2.24 S 
Requirement Criticality to Fear 
of Protest 
.06 1.02 Control 
Protest Risk to Fear of Protest .15 2.57 Control 
H3: Fear of Protest to 
Compromised Technical 
Evaluation 
.21 3.29 S 
†***H4: Fear of Protest to 
Source Selection Method 
Appropriateness 
  NS 
H5:Fear of Protest to Added 
PALT 
.12 2.16 S 
H6: Fear of Protest to 
Contracting Officer Perceived 
Authority 
-.11 -1.91 S** 
H7:  Contracting Officer 
Perceived Authority to 
Compromised Technical 
Evaluation 
-.23 -3.97 S 
H9:  Compromised Technical 
Evaluation to Contractor 
Performance 
-.21 -3.64 S 
***H10:  Source Selection 
Method Appropriateness to 
Contractor Performance 
  NS 
    
H11: Contracting Officer 
Perceived Authority to 
Contractor Performance 
.22 2.97 S 
*Supported(S)/Not Supported(NS) at the .05 level of significance;  
**Marginally significant (p<.10) 
***SSMA trimmed from the full model due to poor fit 
****H7 Not tested via SEM 
†Also see Post Hoc Analysis section below for partial support for H4. 
 
Hypothesis eight (H8) posited a positive relationship between 
fear of protest and transaction costs. Complete and valid data to 
measure transaction costs was only obtained from 270 of the 350 
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respondents; therefore, H8 was tested outside of the SEM model using 
regression, and was supported (F=5.63; β=.14, t=2.37, p=.018).  The 
values of transaction costs ranged from $700.08 to $3,551,944.33. The 
average transaction cost per source selection was $235,236.34 (median 
= $165,832.55; std dev = $291,620.05).  
Control Variables 
Two control variables were used in order to account for the 
expected significant effects on fear of protest. Requirement criticality 
represents the level of significance of a particular acquisition to the unit’s 
mission. This predictor did not significantly affect fear of protest (Table 
6). Protest risk consists of two parts since risk is comprised of the sum of 
the products of the magnitude of the consequences and the probability of 
occurrence. Questions assessed the desirability of each of five 
consequences of a protest and each of their associated probabilities of 
occurring. The five consequences were validated by interview informants 
to be those most likely to occur and those most abhorred. Risk was 
calculated by multiplying each consequence’s probability of occurrence 
by the desirability of the consequence. The summed result yielded an 
overall protest risk score for each survey response, or record. Protest 
risk consisted of five possible consequences using a Likert-type scale 
with anchors of completely undesirable and completely desirable, and 
then listed the same five consequences using a probability of occurrence 
scale with anchors of 0% to 100%. Protest risk was a significant predictor 
of fear of protest (Table 6). 
Post Hoc Analysis 
 A series of logistic regressions were then run on the perceived 
appropriateness of two types of source selections—LPTA and full trade-
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off—using respondent rating of appropriateness of the source selection 
method used. The first step in the test was to include only the 
respondents that used the particular source selection method (i.e., LPTA 
or full trade-off). A dummy variable was then created to ascertain how 
appropriate the respondent thought the use of the method was. The 
questions used a seven-point Likert-type scale with 1 being “Completely 
Inappropriate” and 7 being “Completely Appropriate.” Respondents that 
answered the questions with scores of 3 or less were coded as 1, and all 
others were coded as 0. Relevantly, 13 out of 133 respondents used 
LPTA even though they felt it was to some degree inappropriate, and 10 
respondents out of 174 used full trade-off even though they felt it was to 
some degree inappropriate. This totals 7.49% of the 307 respondents 
that used either LPTA or trade-off as a source selection method. Both 
tests used the same binary fear of protest independent variable (Hi/Low) 
in the aforementioned tests. The logistic regression test to measure the 
relationship with the use of the Full Trade-off inappropriateness was not 
significant (p=.181). The test using LPTA inappropriateness was 
significant (p=.015) with an odds ratio of 4.673, revealing partial support 
for H4. A test of the effect of LPTA inappropriateness on contractor 
performance was significant and negative (p=.01; odds ratio of -4.36), 
lending partial support to H10. 
 We also measured the difference between how many contracts 
were planned and how many were actually awarded. A binary variable 
was created in which respondents that saw more contracts awarded than 
planned were coded as 1 (19 instances; 5.4%), and all others 0. 
However, the test of a relationship to fear of protest was not significant 
(p=.350). 
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 We asked the 350 respondents how many times they had: (1) 
awarded a task/delivery order, (2) awarded a sole source contract, and 
(3) found a way to modify and existing contract, each in order to avoid a 
protestable competitive procurement. Of the 84 using task orders to 
avoid a protest, they did this 47 times over their career on average. Of 
the 67 using sole source, they did this an average of 15 times. And, of 
the 64 using modifications, they did this 17 times on average. 
DISCUSSSION 
The objective of this research was to measure the magnitude of 
fear of protest and to identify its antecedents and consequences. The 
evidence provides empirical validation for fear of protest. The PVF was 
instructive toward these ends, and helped to explain underlying 
rationales for the effects. The purpose was to better understand the 
impacts that fear of protests has on acquisition strategy decisions. This is 
important since acquisition strategy decisions affect the contractor that is 
selected and the ultimate level of performance that is received. To 
examine fear of protest, a structural equation model of its antecedents 
and consequences was tested and found to exhibit good fit to a sample 
of data from 350 contracting personnel. Many of the findings have 
significant managerial implications to the effective execution of source 
selections. 
Findings and Implications 
 Our evidence reveals that insufficient planned procurement lead-
time increases the level of fear of a protest. When acquisition personnel 
have less time than they believe is necessary to properly conduct the 
source selection, they perceive greater odds of making a mistake that 
could be protested. When contracting officers are rushed, contractual 
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documents (e.g., statements of work) and pre-award communications 
(e.g., negotiations) could be compromised which may decrease 
contractor performance (Hawkins et al., 2011). Shortcuts could preclude 
the selection of the best contractor or result in selecting a contractor that 
does not fully understand the requirements. To prevent rushed 
acquisitions, standard lead times by type of source selection and by 
complexity of the requirement could be established. 
 A contracting officer’s experience lowered the level of fear of bid 
protests. Of the 350 survey respondents, the average number of source 
selections experienced over a career was of 36.7. That is just under 2.8 
source selections per year. Note that this seemingly high number of 
source selections likely includes simplified buys and experience in a 
variety of roles such as a peer or committee reviewer as well as a 
contracting officer. Increasing the number of source selections 
experienced by contracting officers can decrease the fear of protests. 
There is no equal alternative to on-the-job-training (OJT), but source 
selection simulations and scenario-based training could be utilized as an 
alternative and as a supplement to OJT. If the acquisition community is 
relying solely on OJT, it can take a contracting officer and technical 
evaluators far too long to gain an adequate level of competence with 
FAR Part 15 source selections.  
 Fear of protest appeared to compromise technical evaluations; 
compromised technical evaluations decreased contractor performance.  
This construct assessed phenomena such as: (1) technical evaluators 
not being allowed to say what needs to be said in a technical evaluation, 
(2) constraints imposed on the evaluations impeding the ability to write a 
meaningful evaluation, and (3) upon evaluation of proposals, a technical 
evaluator recognizing a need to change at least one evaluation criterion 
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or its definition. Additional training for the technical evaluators could help 
increase their level of competence within the evaluation process. The 
evaluation process involves many people that are not necessarily familiar 
with the case law and pitfalls giving rise to bid protests. Additionally, the 
technical individuals that determine and define the evaluation criteria 
should be the same individuals that evaluate proposals (i.e., apply the 
criteria). Current, detailed, and standardized training for technical 
evaluators should result in better-defined evaluation criteria and better 
application of them to proposals. 
 While fear of protest did not affect perceived source selection 
method appropriateness, protest fear was associated with the 
inappropriate use of the LPTA source selection method; in turn, LPTA 
inappropriateness negatively affected contractor performance. While 
these effects have been anecdotally espoused by practitioners, this 
research is the first to quantitatively test the postulates. There were 23 
respondents (7.5%) that revealed that the source selection method used 
was to some degree inappropriate. While this proportion appears small, it 
can be argued that any single instance of an inappropriate source 
selection method gives room for pause. LPTA could be inappropriately 
used since: (1) evaluations can generally be accomplished more quickly 
and easily when evaluated as pass/fail rather than by a subjective rating; 
(2) the government’s recent increased focus on low price; and (3) the 
lower odds of receiving a bid protest compared to arduous and mistake-
prone procedures of a full tradeoff method. Further research should 
confirm reasons why inappropriate source selection methods are 
employed, then acquisition leaders should seek ways to mitigate those 
factors. Perhaps contracting officers should be able to tap an 
independent panel of contracting professionals when they encounter 
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leaders or reviewers who will only approve a source selection method 
that does not correspond well to the buying situation.  
 These findings are also germane to contractors. When a buying 
office develops an acquisition strategy that appears ill-suited to the 
buying situation (e.g., LPTA versus full tradeoff for a highly complex 
requirement), it may be due to the fear of a bid protest. However, 
prospective offerors may misinterpret the use of LPTA as an added 
emphasis on price. Their bid strategy, then, may be influenced by 
reducing costs and price, thereby putting high performance at risk, even 
though the agency may not actually be terribly concerned about price. 
 The fear of protest diminishes a contracting officer’s perceived 
authority. Diminished contracting officer perceived authority was found to 
decrease contractor performance directly. Contracting officer’s perceived 
authority also affects contractor performance indirectly by decreasing 
compromised technical evaluations. Many decisions and source 
selection documents receive scrutiny via a litany of outside reviews (e.g., 
supervisors, peer review, contracts committees, legal). Often, legal 
consel and committee advisors will conservatively require wording 
changes to documents, changes to ratings, amendments to the request 
for proposals, impose further discussions to clear up any uncertainty in 
evaluations, and retain offerors in the competitive range – just to name a 
few. 
 This level of oversight is another signal of the importance the 
government places in avoiding a bid protest. Admittedly, it also coincides 
with a less competent acquisition workforce (Punaro, 2012). Rather than 
treating the problem, however, the symptoms gain the attention; fixing 
the problems of contracting officer competence and a cumbersome 
source selection processes is difficult and lengthy, while adding oversight 
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is quick and simple. The implications are clear: better training is needed 
for contracting personnel and technical evaluators to develop the 
requisite competence in source selections, and then oversight and 
reviews should be curtailed. Ann Rung, the new administrator for the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policies, recently released an 
improvement plan identifying acquisition workforce talent development 
as a key to innovation and performance (Miller, 2014). Some protest risk 
must be accepted for the sake of efficiency and better decision making 
(i.e., negotiations and award determination) leading to higher contractor 
performance. 
 This research confirmed the presence of outside influence on 
acquisition strategy decisions, and these influences carry associated 
implications for contracting. During measurement scale development, 
one interviewed expert commented, “I will tell you, legal pushes the 
LPTA. They push it a lot.” One survey respondent offered, “At this 
juncture, there are too many hands in the soup, and the procuring 
contracting officer (PCO) authority has been diminished. Attorneys need 
to resume the role of counselors again.” Since the source selection 
method is not a matter of legal sufficiency, attorney influence is curious. 
Selecting the source selection method is a contracting officer’s decision 
based on experience, knowledge, and professional judgment. Otherwise, 
Government agencies may employ a costly professional contracting 
workforce with a high degree of accountability but diminished authority. If 
not capable, trusted and empowered to make the necessary decisions, 
procurement clerks (e.g., series 1105) would be much less costly than 
contracting professionals (e.g., series 1102). 
 The fear of protest is positively related to an increase in 
transaction costs. Costs were assessed in terms of the number of 
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personnel involved in a sources selection and their allocated time. The 
average cost per source selection was $235,236 (median = $165,832) 
with a standard deviation of $291,620.  Notably, these costs are 
understated by considering direct salaries only; they exclude the true 
burdened cost of a government employee. An average of 9 different 
people worked on a given source selection team in the various roles (an 
average of 3.5 full-time equivalents).  As a percentage of the total 
contract price, the transaction costs averaged 7.7% (median 1.2%).  
Compared to common interagency surcharges for contracting services 
(that cover post-award administration costs in addition to sourcing costs) 
of one-to-eight percent, these pre-award sourcing-only costs seem 
excessive.  Thus, agencies may be operating at costs well above their 
collected fees, and these costs can be traced to fear of protests. 
 Post hoc analysis showed that as the fear of protest increases, 
the number of personnel and the actual procurement lead time increase. 
From the data, the average planned PALT was 183 days. The average 
actual PALT was 237 days. The difference, 54 days, constitutes added 
transaction costs, indicating the degree to which efficiency is 
compromised by fear of protest. While these salary costs may be 
dismissed as sunk costs, certainly excess personnel could accomplish 
other pertinent work if not serving on the source selection team for an 
extended time. These opportunity costs should not be ignored, 
particularly given the ubiquitous, persistent failures in other areas of 
acquisition such as contract administration (DODIG, 2009). Measures 
that reduce the fear of protest should decrease transaction costs. 
Likewise, if evaluation, negotiation, internal reviews, and documentation 
processes can be streamlined, and if agencies can accept more protest 
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risk, perhaps lead time can be saved, resulting in reduced transaction 
costs. 
 Given the government’s budget constraints and highly-leveraged 
financing, the significant transaction costs associated with source 
selections should not continue to be ignored. A first step would be to 
capture the quantified resources required to execute a source selection 
in a contract action reporting database (e.g., FPDS-NG). Agencies could 
also follow the for-profit sector’s lead by assessing and publishing key 
metrics such as total spend per sourcing full-time equivalent (CAPS 
Research, 2011). 
 These results surrounding transaction costs raise questions 
concerning the acquisition process in general. For instance, an important 
criterion for new case law - and hence, new reactive policies and 
regulations – is fairness, with little regard for efficiency. Is there a ceiling 
cost on fairness?  Is there a point at which fairness is too costly?  
Additionally, the high transaction costs suggest that the drivers of those 
costs be considered. Can policies, procedures, laws, case law, and 
regulations be reexamined and streamlined without compromising 
fairness? Is government procurement at the point of a source selection 
overhaul with a keen eye toward efficiency? 
Study Limitations & Future Research Directions 
Limitations of this study, and those common to survey 
methodologies, should be considered. First, the response rate is 
remarkably low. However, it is not unlike that of other published business 
research. Melnyk et al., (2012) revealed a sharp decline in response 
rates starting in 2002, with a steady decline of 1% annually. Five top 
journals reported low-end survey response rates ranging from 3% to 8%. 
Survey length is thought to be one of the key contributors to the decline. 
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This survey was necessarily lengthy, and parts of it involved consulting 
records rather than merely offering attitudes or opinions. Second, 
because this sample came solely from one military service, the extent of 
generalizability of the study findings to other government agencies is 
unknown. Third, the research design relied upon self-reported data from 
respondents introducing a threat of common method variance (CMV) 
(Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Harman’s one-factor test revealed that when 
all of the items were run in a single factor analysis, the unrotated solution 
did not result in a single factor, nor did it result in a general factor that 
accounted for most of the covariation (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Fourth, 
the perceptual variable LPTA appropriateness was measured with a 
single item; thus, its reliability could not be determined. 
Due to the low amounts of variance in the dependent variables 
explained by the predictors, other factors that affect the fear of protest, 
compromised technical evaluations, added procurement lead time, and 
contracting officer perceived authority should be explored. Future 
research could also investigate why source selection methods that are 
perceived to be inappropriate are sometimes used. Finally, future 
research could replicate this study in civilian U.S. government agencies 
and in those of other countries. 
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APPENDIX A 
Interview Questions for Measurement Scale Development And 
Informant Demographics 
 
 Interview question 
1 How important to you is avoiding a bid protest?  
2 Why is avoiding a bid protest important? 
3 What are the negative consequences of a bid protest? 
4 Are there any positive outcomes of receiving a bid protest? 
5 Are some members of the source selection team more fixated 
on avoiding a bid protest than others?  Who?  Why? 
6 If there were no ability to protest, would you have done anything 
differently in the past on a source selection (e.g., acquisition 
strategy elements)?    
7 Do you believe that source selection teams alter acquisition 
strategies in order to avoid bid protests?   What are the 
outcomes of these alterations?   
8 What extraordinary measures have you observed or heard of 
that source selection teams have taken to avoid a bid protest? 
 
Interviews 
 Contracting officers at two U.S. military organizations were 
chosen for interviews due to: (a) the convenience of travel, (b) a 
willingness to support the research, and (c) the availability of a wide 
variety of contract types and contracted goods and services for wide 
generalizability (e.g., external validity). A series of questions (see table 
above) was asked to each participant. 
 Eighteen individuals were interviewed over two days. 
Demographics of each respondent can be found in below. Each interview 
was recorded and transcribed.  The average interview lasted 26 minutes.  
The interviews resulted transcribed into 229 pages. Informants were 
given a copy of the conceptual model during the interview and asked 
whether they agreed with the independent variables being used. They 
were also asked if they would add any or take any away. One 
respondent stated, “Okay. This is good. I don’t see anything that I need 
to add.” Another contracting officer stated, “I think this is a great research 
that you are doing because this is a bigger and bigger issue. I think you 
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are right on.” Other statements that validated the model were, “I think I 
like the model. For the most part it says everything.” 
 
Rank/
Grade Gender Duty Title 
Yrs. 
Exp 
# Source 
Selections 
(within 2 
yrs) 
# Bid 
Protest 
(within 
2 yrs) 
GS-14 F 
Supv. 
Contracting 
Officer 29 12 0 
GS-13 M 
Contracting 
Officer 26 9 3 
GS-13 M 
Contracting 
Officer 18 6 1 
GS-14 M 
Supv. 
Contracting 
Officer 36 1 0 
GS-13 F 
Contracting 
Officer 6 4 0 
GS-14 F 
Supv. 
Contracting 
Officer 32 3 0 
GS-12 M 
Contract 
Specialist 4 0 0 
GS-13 M 
Contracting 
Officer 6 6 0 
GS-12 M 
Contract 
Specialist 7 4 2 
GS-13 M 
Contracting 
Officer 21 1 0 
GS-13 F 
Contracting 
Officer 30 4 0 
GS-13 M 
Contracting 
Officer 22 5 0 
GS-13 F 
Contracting 
Officer 15 5 1 
GS-13 M 
Contracting 
Officer 26 20 1 
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APPENDIX B 
Latent Construct Measurement Scales 
Label Item 
 
Std. 
Loading 
Fear of Protest  
FEAR1* At some point during the development 
of the acquisition strategy or the source 
selection process, I worried about 
receiving a bid protest. 
.82 
FEAR2* I was concerned that the contract award 
would be protested. 
.94 
FEAR3* I was anxious to get beyond the 10-day 
point after contract award (or 
debriefings) to determine whether or not 
the contract would be protested. 
.83 
FEAR5** During the development of the 
acquisition strategy and throughout 
proposal evaluation, to what extent 
were you concerned that an offeror 
might protest the contract award? 
.74 
   
Perceived Contracting Officer Authority  
AUTH1 I was empowered to make required 
decisions throughout the source 
selection. 
.83 
AUTH2 I was trusted that the decisions I made 
throughout the source selection would 
be appropriate. 
.92 
AUTH3 My management supported me on the 
decisions I made during the source 
selection. 
.82 
   
Sufficiency of Planned PALT  
PALTP1* The milestones for awarding this 
contract were too aggressive. 
 
.70 
PALTP2 I was not rushed to award this contract. 
 
.66 
PALTP3 I had sufficient time to get this contract 
awarded. 
.93 
   
Compromised Technical Evaluation  
CTE2* At least one technical evaluator 
expressed concern about not being able 
to say what needs to be said in the 
technical evaluation. 
.84 
CTE3* At least one technical evaluator was 
concerned that the constraints imposed 
on his or her evaluations impeded the 
evaluator’s ability to write a meaningful 
evaluation. 
.91 
CTE6* Upon evaluation of proposals, at least 
one technical evaluator expressed a 
need to change at least one evaluation 
.45 
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criterion or its definition. 
   
Requirement Criticality  
RC2 This requirement supported a core 
competency of our customer’s 
organization. 
.84 
RC3 Compared to other purchases for this 
customer, this requirement was 
important. 
.87 
RC4* 
 
An unsuccessful outcome of the RFP 
would have had only minor 
consequences to our customer  
.73 
   
Contractor Performance  
CP1 Product/service quality per 
specifications 
.90 
CP2 Delivery performance per specifications .92 
CP3 Product/service consistently meets 
customer expectations 
.92 
CP5 Required service and/or technical 
support 
.89 
CP6 Non-conformance rate .80 
CP7 Overall performance .94 
   
Source Selection Method Appropriateness  
SSMA1 Our acquisition strategy was the best 
means to source our requirement. 
.97 
SSMA2 Our acquisition strategy was the best 
means to achieve our acquisition 
objectives. 
.94 
SSMA6 Our acquisition strategy provided the 
best fit to the buying situation (e.g., 
complexity, dollar value, acquisition 
objectives, contract length, performance 
risk, criticality to the mission, availability 
of supply, time available to award a 
contract, etc.). 
.74 
   
Protest Risk  
PR1 Increased costs to settle a terminated 
contract(s). 
N/A 
PR2 Time delay to the mission.  
 
N/A 
PR3 Embarrassment/shame. 
 
N/A 
PR4 Increase in workload to resolve the 
protest. 
 
N/A 
PR5 Career repercussions for making a 
mistake or omission that caused a bid 
protest.  
 
N/A 
 
Notes: (1) All responses were obtained using 7-point Likert-type scales; 
(2) * anchors of strongly agree and strongly disagree; (3) 
** anchors of not at all concerned and extremely concerned 
